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Abstract
Terrorism instills fear in the minds of people and takes away the freedom of
individuals to act as they will. Terrorism has turned out to be an international
menace today. Here, we study the terrorist attack incidents which occurred in
the last half-century across the globe from the open source, Global Terrorism
Database, and develop a view on their spatio-temporal dynamics. We construct
a complex network of global terrorism and study its growth dynamics, along with
the statistical properties of the anti-social network, which are quite intriguing.
Normally, each nation pursues its own vision of international security based
upon its mandate and particular notions of politics and its policies to counter the
threat of terrorism that could naturally include the use of tactical measures and
strategic negotiations, or even physical power. We study the network resilience
against targeted attacks and random failures, which could guide the counter-
terrorist outfits in designing strategies to fight terrorism. We then use a disparity
filter method to isolate backbone of the network, and identify the terror hubs
and vulnerable motifs of global terrorism. We also examine evolution of the
hubs and motifs in a few exemplary cases like Afghanistan, Colombia, India,
Israel, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. The dynamics of the terror hubs
and the vulnerable motifs that we discover in the network backbone turn out
to be very significant, and may provide deep insight on their formations and
spreading, and thereby help in contending terrorism or framing public policies
that can check their spread.
Keywords: social networks — complex systems — terror attacks — media
reports — motifs
1. Introduction
Humans are social animals and since the early days of evolution, they have
preferred to form and stay together in groups. These groups have evolved from
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simple settlements to huge nations; defined by multiple causes like language,
common heritage, geographical boundaries, and even ideology. The human co-
operation has been a motivating force behind the rapid progress of man [1].
Often evolutionary efforts induced the increase in human cooperation. Vari-
ous factors, like delayed self-sustenance of young ones, or fear of elimination
by neighboring communes competing for similar resources which obstructed the
humans to sustain their progeny became reasons for cooperation. This coopera-
tion extended from blood relatives to totally unrelated individuals. Surprisingly,
evolution has also been responsible for drawing distinctions among themselves
in their bids for the survival of the fittest. This segregation [2, 3] can be seen
in various forms of race, caste, class, religion, political ideology, etc. Thus, the
human social behavior has been extremely convoluted with multiple parameters
playing crucial roles. It is extremely difficult to assess the complexity of human
social behavior, which has a wide range — co-operations, bonding, conflicts,
aggression, coups, wars, etc.
Similar to conflicts, aggression and wars, which have plagued mankind from
antiquity, acts of terrorism — where a small group of individuals which are
similarly motivated in fighting another social institution or organization or ex-
ercising indiscriminate violence in achieving financial, political, religious or ide-
ological aim is hardly new. Though there is no single definition, terrorism may
be broadly defined as a conscious and deliberate attempt to incite fear among
masses through violence or the threat of violence to pursue a political or ideo-
logical gain [4, 5]. The aim of terrorism is not limited to eliminating the target
group or destruction of opponent’s resources, rather it is specifically carried out
to send out a psychological message to the adversary. It is meant to propagate
fear among the wider general public which may encompass rival religious or
ethnic group, a state government, or an entire country. Even though terrorism
has been prevalent ever since modern political landscape has existed, past few
decades have seen an exponential increase in terrorist incidents. The scope and
nature of terrorist attacks have also evolved rapidly, a fact that became evident
to the world on September 11, 2001, when a series of four coordinated attacks
were conducted in the United States by the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Academic
and social media reports show the increase in number of terrorist acts, as well
as terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the stretch of the targeted locations
has extended on a global scale. These realities have made it incessantly difficult
for counter-terrorist organizations or governments in terminating these terrorist
acts.
Apart from solutions by social scientists, physicists have recently tried to
provide mathematical models, statistical and network analyses and potential
solutions to the menaces of terrorism [6, 7, 8], conflicts [9, 10] and other social
phenomena [11, 12, 13]. Like business conglomerates, terrorist organizations
have also formed transnational ties. They are inter-connected (in a state) and
have links with other terrorist organizations outside of the geographical bound-
aries of the target state.
In this paper, we develop and present a network-based study [14, 15] of
identification of terrorist hubs and their vulnerable targets. We analyze the
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terrorist events obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [16, 17],
which collected reports from the printed and digital media, from 1970 to 2016.
It is assumed that the media reports are unbiased and provide fair accounts
of the actual events. We construct a complex network of global terrorism and
investigate the network characteristics of this anti-social network. We study the
resilience of the network against targeted attacks and random failures [18, 15],
which could guide the counter-terrorist outfits in designing strategies to fight
terrorism. We also use a disparity filter method [19] to isolate the backbone of
this network and identify the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs of global ter-
rorism. We then examine the evolution of the hubs and motifs in a few special
cases like Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Israel, Pakistan and the United King-
dom. The backbone evolution reflects the change of relative importance of the
terror hubs and the vulnerable motifs, which is in conformity with international
affairs, peace accords, etc.
2. Data, Methodology and Results
2.1. Data description and filtration
The source for this analysis is open-access Global Terrorism Database (GTD),
[16, 17] generously provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Ter-
rorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland. GTD
contains the database of news articles from all over the world. The data pro-
vides a detailed account of terrorist events from 1970 to 2016, except for year
1993 for which no data exists. The dataset has 170350 instances divided into 135
attributes. For each instance/event-data, we filtered information such as source,
target, date of event, organizations or groups, the location information of the
event, as well as latitude, longitude data of actors and the event. The dataset
required considerable cleaning before any study could be done. The doubtful
events, suggested by dataset itself, were removed. Further, attacks carried out
by “Unknown” terrorist organization on “Unknown” targets were also filtered
out. The events which had no spatial information in the dataset were removed,
too. To maintain the network modularity at the country level, any attack which
targeted international community instead of a particular nationality was also
not included in the dataset. We finally had 64855 events in 46 years (no records
available for year 1993).
2.2. Network construction
We analyze the terrorist attacks over a 46 year period (1970-2016), excluding
1993 (non-availability of data for the given period), such that the temporal
granularity of our data analyses is one day. Over a period of time τ , we construct
the network of ‘connected’ actors in the following way: Whenever a terrorist
source, actor a1, attacks a target, actor a2, it is recorded as an event E1 at time
t ∈ [t0 : t0 + τ ], an edge or directed link ‘connects’ the source to the target by
an arrow of unit weight (could be generalized by weighing the edge by impact
of attack, etc.), where t0 is the initial time in the entire span τ . If another event
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E2 within the same time window involves source a3 and target a2, then a3 is
connected to a2 with a directed link of unit weight. Thus, sources a1 and a3 are
both connected to the common target a2. Aggregating all such events over the
time window τ , connected components are formed. Every time the same pair
of actors are engaged, the edge mention (weight) increases by unity. Thus, the
weight of an edge is the frequency of occurrence of attacks between the pair of
source and target.
2.3. Disparity filter
To find the backbone structure of a weighted network, we have used an algo-
rithm proposed by Serrano et al. [19]. The disparity filter algorithm extracts the
network backbone by considering the relevant edges at all the scales present in
the system and exploiting the local heterogeneity and local correlations among
the weights. The disparity filter has a cut-off parameter αc, which determines
the number of edges that are reduced in the original network. The filter, how-
ever, preserves the cut-off of the degree distribution, the form of the weight
distribution, and the clustering coefficient. We discuss the choice of the cut-off
parameter αc below.
2.4. Results
2.4.1. Network structure and backbone using disparity filter
Fig. 1 (a) shows the spatio-temporal distribution of the events across the
globe; the dots representing the locations, colored according to different decades
during which the events occurred. Evidently, past few decades have seen an
exponential increase in terrorist incidents (see Supplementary Information Fig.
S2, where year-wise evolution along with the associated frequencies of events are
depicted). Note that during the period 1970-1990, the maximum value stayed
at 2186, while during the period of 1995-2015 this value shot from 364 to 5703,
with some fluctuations in between. Fig. 1 (b) shows a network aggregated over
the period 1970-2016. Two types of actors are involved in the network: source
and target (source nodes refer to the terrorist organizations and target nodes
are the victims). Each actor is a node and whenever two actors are involved
in an event, a directed link is drawn from source to target. The network has a
giant component (colored in grey) in the center, surrounded by 168 peripheral
isolated clusters (colored in black), while the nodes colored in red are showing
the backbone. The zoomed-in view of the backbone structure is shown in Fig. 1
(c). The terrorist network for the entire period consists of 5568 nodes, 64855
edge mentions, and 10379 unique edges, with the giant component consists of
5148 nodes. Thus, the giant component encompasses more than 92% of the
network nodes, implying that terrorism is closely linked across the globe and
the backbone structure encompasses 8% of the total nodes of the network with
disparity filter [19] cut-off αc = 0.01 during the period 1970-2016.
The decade-wise evolution of the aggregate network, its giant component (in
grey) as well as the backbone (in red) are shown in Fig. S10 of Supplementary
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(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 1: (a) Spatio-temporal evolution of attacks from 1970-2016. The different colored dots
indicate the locations of the attacks, along with the years mentioned in the legend. The map
and international boundaries are generated using the proprietary software Tableau Desktop
version 10.5.0. (b) The aggregated network of terrorism for the period 1970-2016 – Network of
terrorist attacks constructed from the history of the events. Two types of actors are involved
in the network: Source and target (source nodes refer to the terrorist organizations and target
nodes are the victims). Each actor is a node and whenever two actors are involved in an event,
a directed link is drawn from source to target. The network has a giant component (grey) in
the center, surrounded by 168 peripheral isolated clusters (black), while the nodes colored in
red are showing the backbone; the average degree of a node in the network is 3.718. (c) The
zoomed-in view of the backbone of the network, which has been identified using the disparity
filter with αc = 0.01 (described above). The backbone contains 8% of the total nodes and 4%
of total edges (details summarized in Table 1)
.
Information. Here, we focus more on the evolution of the backbone. Fig. 2 (a-
d) show the decade-wise evolution of the network backbone from 1970 to 2010,
identified using the disparity filter with αc = 0.01. The comparison of backbone
characteristics (as percentage of the total weights %WT of the network, total
nodes %NT in the network and total unique edges %ET in the network) with
the change in disparity filter cut-off αc, for the different evolving backbones
5
(a) 1970-80 (b) 1970-90
(c) 1970-2000 (d) 1970-2010
Figure 2: Decade-wise evolution of the network backbone from 1970-2010 (a-d) (for 1970-2016
shown in Fig. 1). The zoomed-in views of the backbones of the growing network, which have
been identified using the disparity filter with αc = 0.01. The characteristics of the growing
backbone structure for the different decades are summarized in Table1.
for the period 1970-1980, 1970-1990, 1970-2000, 1970-2010, and 1970-2016, is
summarized in Table 2. We have studied other choices of αc (see Fig. S5 in
Supplementary Information) as well, to check the granularity and details of
motifs. In this paper, for filtering the backbone of the network, we choose αc
at 0.01, which captures the motifs at the country level efficiently and provides
fairly accurate insights in terms of the participation of the actors (sources and
targets).
2.4.2. Network statistical properties
As mentioned earlier, we construct the aggregate network over a given period
of time, for the entire 46 years period (1970-2016) as well as for decade-wise
period 1970-1980, 1970-1990, 1990-2000, and 1970-2010. Each event is visualized
as a link between the source and target involved, which are the nodes, thus
creating a network of actors connected by events. The details of the construction
6
Table 1: Characteristics of the growing backbone structures (with αc = 0.01) in Fig. 2, for
the different decades.
Year Nodes (%) Edges (%) Edge mentions (%)
Number of
clusters
Average number
of neighbors
1970-1980 82 (16) 63 (3) 2490 (38) 20 1.537
1970-1990 179 (17) 156 (4) 12440 (56) 35 1.743
1970-2000 265 (7) 230 (4) 17730 (57) 51 1.736
1970-2010 341 (7) 308 (4) 23707 (57) 60 1.806
1970-2016 470 (8) 427 (4) 40467 (62) 79 1.817
Table 2: Comparison of backbone characteristics (as percentage figures of the total weights
%WT of the network, total nodes %NT in the network and total unique edges %ET in the
network) with the change in disparity filter cut-off αc, for the different evolving backbones.
Year αc %WT %NT %ET
1970-1980
0.05 48 9 6
0.04 45 9 5
0.03 43 8 4
0.02 40 7 4
0.01 38 6 3
Year αc %WT %NT %ET
1970-1990
0.05 65 11 7
0.04 64 10 6
0.03 62 10 5
0.02 60 8 5
0.01 56 7 4
Year αc %WT %NT %ET
1970-2000
0.05 65 11 6
0.04 64 10 6
0.03 63 9 5
0.02 61 8 5
0.01 57 7 4
Year αc %WT %NT %ET
1970-2010
0.05 65 12 7
0.04 64 11 6
0.03 63 10 5
0.02 60 9 5
0.01 57 7 4
Year αc %WT %NT %ET
1970-2016
0.05 70 13 7
0.04 68 12 6
0.03 67 11 6
0.02 65 10 5
0.01 62 8 4
7
is given in the Methods section 2.2. A typical network is shown in Fig. 1 (a) for
data aggregated over the year 1970-2016.
We extracted the number of edge mentions w of a unique pair of actors
(source-target), as well as the number of unique actors k, one actor is involved
with. In terms of the network theory, w is the link weight and k the degree
of a node (out-degree for sources and in-degree for targets). While k measures
the importance, activity or visibility of a single actor, w measures the frequency
of involvement of an actor pair (source-target) in the terrorist events. Since
this is a directed network, the nodes have distinct out-degree and in-degree
distributions. These quantities are measured decade-wise for the 46 year period
(1970-2016) as well as through the whole period (aggregate over 46 years).
We computed the complementary cumulative probability distribution (CCDF)
for different quantities for the aggregated network in 1970-1980, 1970-1990,
1970-2000, 1970-2010 and 1970-2016 (refer to Fig. 3 a-f). The complementary
cumulative probability density functions for degree Q(k) (out- and in-degrees)
and the edge-mentions Q(w), which appear to be broad distributions (stretched-
exponentials) (see Fig. 3). The CCDF’s Q(s) of the cluster size s for the growing
networks are shown in Fig. 3 (f); evidently, the outliers correspond to the sizes
of the growing giant cluster (as percentage of the total number of nodes in the
network): 1210 (83%) (1970-80), 2346 (88%) (1970-90), 3313 (86%) (1970-2000),
4220 (90%) (1970-2010) and 5148 (92%) (1970-2016).
The above results quantitatively characterize the heterogeneity in the activ-
ities of the different actors (sources and targets)– while most actors (or actor-
pairs) are relatively less active, a few are very active (see table 3 for the list
of top-50 actor pairs). The broad degree distributions show little change with
time. Notably, the average clustering coefficient (for directed network [20, 21])
of the nodes in the backbone is zero, contrary to most social networks of friend-
ships, collaborations, etc., where typically the average clustering coefficient is
high [14, 15]. This implies the absence of loops or cyclicity in the network.
2.4.3. Tolerance to attack and failure.
We studied the network resilience– how the network breaks down under at-
tack, in order to stop terrorism activities to happen [18]. The largest connected
component of the network (i.e., the giant component) is subjected to targeted at-
tack by removal of the most connected nodes (in terms of the source out-degree,
which corresponds to a terrorist organization, etc.). As the network is directed,
so we start removing the source node with the highest out-degree, followed by
the next highest out-degree and so on. This results in rapid fragmentation or
destruction of the network by removing all the source nodes in comparison with
random node removal. We compute the fraction of nodes present in the largest
connected component (GC ), which is observed to decrease very quickly, and the
average number of nodes in the isolated clusters other than the giant compo-
nent 〈ac〉, with increasing fraction of removed nodes. The network and the giant
component are destroyed faster by targeted nodes removal (attack), compared
to the random node removal (failure), GC becomes zero after about 33% of the
sources are removed through the former method, and about 87% of the sources
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 3: Structural properties of the network decade-wise: 1970-1980 (light green circle),
1970-1990 (blue diamond), 1970-2000 (red square). 1970-2010 (magenta triangle) and 1970-
2016 (green star). (a and b) Plot of the cumulative probability (CCDF) Q(k) that an actor
is connected to k others or more (in-degree and out-degree). (c and d) Plot of the cumulative
probability (CCDF) Q(m) that an actor is mentioned at least m times (in-degree and out-
degree). (e) Plot of the cumulative probability Q(w) that an actor pair is mentioned at least
w times. (f) Plot of the cumulative probability (CCDF) for Q(c) that there is a cluster of size
larger than c. The size of the largest clusters (seen as outliers) are very large compared to the
rest.
are removed through the latter, as shown in Fig. 4. The results are very similar
to those of the studies by Sharma et al. [9], but we reiterate that in this case
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4: (a) The structure of the network (directed) under targeted attack: Terrorist source
nodes are removed in the sequence of their out-degree starting from the highest out-degree.
The plots shows the behavior of the giant component GC (fraction of nodes in the largest
connected component) and the average number of nodes in the isolated clusters other than
the giant component 〈ac〉, with increasing fraction of removed nodes. (b) The structure of
the network (directed) under random failure: Nodes having out-degree are removed randomly.
The network and the giant component are destroyed faster by targeted nodes removal (attack),
compared to the random node removal (failure): GC becomes zero after about 33% of the
sources are removed through the former method, and about 87% of the sources are removed
through the latter. The results are shown for the network aggregated over 1970− 2016.
we have a directed network and we remove only the source nodes (terrorists).
2.4.4. Motifs and hubs
Using the disparity filter method, we isolated the backbone of network for
different time periods and identified the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs of
global terrorism. As obvious, only the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs that
are very frequently engaged do appear in the backbone. We show in Fig. 5, the
evolution of hubs and motifs in a few exemplary cases like Afghanistan (AFG),
Colombia (COL), India (IND), Israel (ISR), Pakistan (PAK) and the United
Kingdom (GBR). The very fact that the backbone structure evolves indicates
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that often some terrorist organizations gain more prominence than others. Ex-
amining these hubs and motifs, we observe that the star-structure occurs quite
frequently in the backbone: One source attacking many targets, or one target
being attacked by many sources. The backbone structure of ISR grows from a
simple structure of 1 source and 2 targets (average degree 1.33) in 1970-1980,
to an intricate structure of 14 sources and 6 targets (average degree 1.90) in
1970-2016. Further analysis reveals that before 2000 the Israel-Palestinian con-
flict was limited to the aggression between the two states. Later, Palestinian
organizations like Hamas, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, al-Aqsa
Martyr’s Brigade, etc., assumed prominence in the conflicts against the state
of Israel. The backbone structure of GBR remains fairly the same; the average
degree grows from 1.85 (1970-1980) to 1.91 (1970-2016); the Irish Republican
Army is the main terrorist hub, while the private citizens and property is the
most vulnerable target for the entire duration. In COL, the backbone structure
grows from a simple 3 node (1 source and 2 targets) in 1970-1980 to a clustered
11 nodes (5 sources and 6 targets) in 1970-1990; the average degree jumps from
1.33 to 2.91. Then it grows steadily to a closely knit structure of 15 nodes (6
sources and 9 targets) at the end of 2016. We observe that till 2000 there is no
node for the military, but it appears later as a target. This relates to the fact
that military got involved by the state for the eradication of terrorists after the
presidential change in 2002.
Fig. 6 shows that in Indian sub-continent, AFG, IND, and PAK are among
the nations which have suffered highest terrorist attacks in the recent decades
(see Supplementary Information Fig. S2). Interestingly, AFG does not appear
in the backbone till 2000, and government (Diplomatic) GOVD USA is a com-
mon target which links two countries AFG and PER. This is typically the case
in many other empirical networks, where there exists a node connecting two
modules or communities [22]. In AFG and PER, we again see the appearance
of star structures, as in GBR. In IND, the rise (and fall) of the attacks by Sikh
extremists in the state of Punjab (1980-2000), Separatists India in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir (1990-2016), and Maoists in the states of Andhra Pradesh,
Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal (2000-2016), are note-
worthy. The backbone structure of PAK significantly exposes the change in the
prominence of terrorist organizations in various decades. With Muttahida Qami
Movement having prominence in the early decades, it is replaced by Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan, formed in 2007 in the 2010 decade. Also, Khorasan Chapter
of the Islamic State, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Baloch Liberation Front have increased
their attacks in the current decade, rightly captured in the backbone.
In addition, we have observed in Fig. 2 that El Salvador (SLV) appeared
in 1970-1980 and 1970-1990 backbones, but did not appear thereafter; this con-
forms to the fact that Chapultepec peace accords were signed in 1992 and the
terrorist attacks reduced.
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Figure 5: Cumulative growth of the terror hubs and vulnerable targets in backbones of the
countries: Israel (ISR), Columbia (COL), the United Kingdom (GBR), India (IND), Pakistan
(PAK) and Afghanistan (AFG) from Fig. 1.
3. Discussion
We have examined the spatio-temporal dynamics of the terrorist events
across the globe, using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [16, 17] from
1970 to 2016. We developed the view of a complex network of global terrorism
and studied its growth dynamics. The network always had a giant component,
which was in the range of 83% to 92% of the total number of network nodes.
The statistical properties of the network were found to be quite robust. The
CCDF’s for the (in- and out-) degrees (k) and edge mentions (w) seem to be
broad (stretched-exponentials). The network resilience results yielded that the
giant component disappeared after about 33% of the hubs (in descending or-
der of magnitude) were removed; in the case of random removal of sources, the
giant component disappears much slower– only after 87% of the sources were
removed.
We isolated the backbone of the terrorist network using the disparity filter
method, and identified the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs of global terrorism.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 6: Spatio-temporal evolution of Indian sub-continent. Event locations decade-wise
(a-e), for the countries: Afghanistan (AFG), India (IND) and Pakistan (PAK). The maps
and international boundaries are generated using the proprietary software Tableau Desktop
version 10.5.0. The results are in conformity with the backbone structures of the actor pairs
of countries shown in Table 3 and Fig. 2 respectively.
We have chosen αc = 0.01 such that it enables us to follow the country-wise
evolution of the terror hubs and vulnerable motifs that appear in the backbone
structures, and we extracted the backbones of the networks for the different
periods of evolution. Fig. 1 (c) shows the backbone for the network with the
aggregated data from 1970 to 2016, consisting of 470 nodes (8% of the total
network), 427 edges (4% of the total network) and 40467 edge mentions (62% of
the total network). The backbone nodes primarily lie in the giant component,
with few in the periphery. The complete lists of 190 unique sources and 280
unique targets (total 470 nodes) are given in Tables S2-S3 in the Supplementary
Information. Fig. 2 shows the growing backbones of the networks for the
different decades of evolution. As time evolves, the backbone structure grows
(number of nodes and edges increase) and becomes more intricate. The number
of nodes, unique edges, edge mentions, number of clusters, and the average
number of neighbors a node possesses in the growing backbone structures as
shown in Fig. 2, are summarized in Table 1. Interestingly, the number of source-
target pairs in the backbone structures– indicated by the number of edges, is
around 4% for most years. However, their frequencies of engagement– indicated
by the number of edge mentions, grows steadily from 38% (1970-1980) to 62%
(1970-2016). The average number of neighbors a node possesses, also increases
from 1.537 (1970-1980) to 1.817 (1970-2016).
The backbones for the various decades contain between 8% to 16% of the
total number of the nodes; the number of unique edges remains fairly constant
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around 4% of the total number of edges in the network. Most importantly, the
edge mentions (weights) grow from 38% to 62% of the total network, signifying
very high frequency of engagement between a small number of source-target
pairs. The terror hubs and vulnerable motifs were seen to have star structures
more frequently than by chance. The average degree of a node in the backbone
increased steadily as time evolved. The average clustering coefficient was always
observed to be zero (indicating the absence of triangles or cyclicity) in the
growing directed network [20, 21], as well as the evolving backbone.
We analyzed the evolutionary structures of the hubs and motifs in Afghanistan,
Colombia, India, Israel, Pakistan and the United Kingdom and found very in-
teresting changes in the structures, especially in the Indian sub-continent. The
backbone structures of the different countries significantly reflected the changes
in the prominence of terrorist organizations in various decades. We also ob-
served that the US citizens, businessmen, and other organizations were often
the common target nodes linking different closed knit communities of terrorist
organizations from other countries. The observation that El Salvador appeared
only in the backbones of 1970-1980 and 1970-1990 and not thereafter, conform-
ing to the fact that Chapultepec peace accords were signed in 1992, is one of
the many significant outcomes of the network backbone analysis. Our results
for the range of provided parameters describe the evolution of terrorism in the
above countries that emerge from the network analysis. The results are in no
way a comment on the previous policies of the Governments of the countries
considered.
The political and socioeconomic conditions along with the local circum-
stances of a region plays key role in framing anti-terrorism policies and elimina-
tion of terrorist ties. The inter-disciplinary approaches of network analysis that
we have used in this paper, may provide supplementary knowledge and insight
on the formation and spreading of terrorism, and thereby help the international
security agencies in contending terrorism, as well as produce acumen for the
policy makers and experts of international relations.
List of top 50 actor pairs
The list of top-50 actor pairs (source–target abbreviations) along with their
weights (frequencies of interactions) that appear in the backbone of the global
terrorist network with 470 nodes and 427 unique edges is given in Table 3.
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Table 3: List of top-50 actor pairs that appear in the backbone structure (1970-2016).
S. No. Source Target Weight S. No. Source Target Weight
1 Taliban AFG POL AFG 1854 26 IRA GBR PCP NIRL 296
2 ISIL IRQ PCP IRQ 1303 27 NPA PHL POL PHL 293
3 Taliban AFG PCP AFG 1086 28 Houthi YEM PCP YEM 292
4 Taliban AFG GOVG AFG 810 29 NPA PHL BUS PHL 291
5 BH NGA PCP NGA 740 30 CPI-Maoist IND GOVG IND 278
6 SPSL PER PCP PER 733 31 LTTE LKA PCP LKA 275
7 FMLN SLV UTL SLV 713 32 IRA GBR BUS NIRL 270
8 SPSL PER GOVG PER 693 33 TTP PAK PCP PAK 267
9 SPSL PER BUS PER 670 34 FARC COL BUS COL 251
10 SPSL PER POL PER 552 35 KWP(PKK) TUR PCP TUR 245
11 ETA ESP POL ESP 530 36 FMLN SLV BUS SLV 243
12 SPSL PER UTL PER 506 37 ELN COL UTL COL 230
13 ETA ESP BUS ESP 495 38 IRA GBR BUS GBR 222
14 ISIL IRQ POL IRQ 451 39 AQI IRQ PCP IRQ 221
15 CPI-Maoist IND PCP IND 448 40 Maoists IND PCP IND 219
16 IRA GBR POL NIRL 433 41 NPA PHL GOVG PHL 218
17 FARC COL PCP COL 391 42 BH NGA POL NGA 218
18 ASB SOM PCP SOM 387 43 FARC COL UTL COL 215
19 KWP(PKK) TUR POL TUR 366 44 FARC COL GOVG COL 211
20 FE NGA PCP NGA 361 45 LTTE LKA POL LKA 207
21 CPI-Maoist IND POL IND 341 46 FLNC FRA BUS FRA 204
22 FARC COL POL COL 333 47 NPA PHL PCP PHL 200
23 FMLN SLV PCP SLV 330 48 PE GBR PCP NIRL 196
24 ASB SOM GOVG SOM 324 49 TTP PAK POL PAK 192
25 Maoists IND POL IND 315 50 ETA ESP GOVG ESP 190
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Supplementary information
Data
The data source utilized for this quantitative analysis of terrorism is obtained
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by the National Con-
sortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at
the University of Maryland, United States. The database was built on unclas-
sified source material publicly available in media, digital news archives, books,
journals, and some legal documents. GTD contains 170350 terrorist events re-
ported for a period of 46 years from 1970 to 2016. The events of 1993 are
not present in the database as they were lost prior to START’s compilation.
The dataset includes 135 variables such as GTD Id, date of incident, incident
location, incident information, attack information, target/victim information,
perpetrator information, perpetrator statistics, claims of responsibility, weapon
information, casualty information, consequences, kidnapping/hostage taking in-
formation, additional information, and source information. A snapshot of few
variables is shown in Figure S7.
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Figure S7: Snapshot displaying few representative columns of the dataset.
Extended results: Figures and tables
Terrorist attacks
Different statistics and details of the terrorist attacks from 1970-2016, are
shown below in Figure S8.
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(a)
(b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure S8: (a) Year-wise count of terror activities. Note that no data was available for the
year 1993. (b) Heatmap of the event count of global terrorism, showing the intensity and
distribution. (c) Count of terror activities in the top-10 affected countries; note the plot
depicts the raw figures for each country (not normalised by population or geographical area).
(d) Target types– most frequent targets of terrorists, and (e) Attack types– favorite modus
operandi for assaults. All results are for the period 1970-2016. The maps and international
boundaries are generated using the proprietary software Tableau Desktop version 10.5.0.
Fatalities vs. injured
The impact of the terrorist attacks, as given by the number of persons killed
or wounded, are shown in Figure S9. Interestingly, they have broad distribu-
tions.
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(a) (b)
Figure S9: Plots of the cumulative probability (CCDF) of (a) killed and (b) wounded for
aggregated period over 1970-2016.
Evolution of Network and Giant Component
Decade-wise evolution of the network and its giant component is shown in
Figure S10.
Figure S10: Plots (a – e) shows decade-wise evolution of the network, its giant component
(in grey) as well as the backbone (in red). The network consists of 1459 nodes in 1970-1980,
2658 nodes in 1970-1990, 3832 nodes in 1970-2000, 4669 nodes in 1970-2010, and 5568 nodes
in 1970-2016. The size of the giant component (shown in grey) and its percentage size with
respect to the entire network is 1210 (83%) in 1970-1980, 2346 (88%) in 1970-1990, 3313
(86%) in 1970-2000, 4220 (90%) in 1970-2010, and 5148 (92%) in 1970-2016. Interestingly,
the backbone identified using the disparity filter and shown in red is primarily a part of the
giant component. The peripheral nodes are colored black.
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The backbone structures are displayed in the Figure S11 as an effect of αc
on the evolving backbones
1970-1980
αc = 0.02 αc = 0.03 αc = 0.04 αc = 0.05
1970-1990
1970-2000
1970-2010
1970-2016
Figure S11: Effect of αc on the evolving backbones. (From Left to Right) Different values
of αc = 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05. (From Top to Bottom) Different decades 1970-1980, 1970-1990,
1970-2000, 1970-2010 and 1970-2016, respectively.
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Lists of names of sources, targets and actor pairs
The names of 190 sources and their abbreviations that appear in the backbone
of the global terrorist network with 470 nodes are given in Table S4.
Table S4: Names and abbreviations of Sources that appear in the
backbone structure (1970-2016).
Sr. No. Source Name Source Abbreviation
1 23rd of September Communist League Mexico 23SepCL MEX
2 31 January People’s Front (FP-31) Guatemala FP-31 GTM
3 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Philippines ASG PHL
4 Action Directe France AcDir FRA
5 African National Congress (South Africa) South Africa ANC ZAF
6 Ajnad Misr Egypt AjM EGY
7 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Israel AQM ISR
8 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade West Bank and Gaza Strip AQM WBGS
9 Al-Fatah West Bank and Gaza Strip Al-Fatah WBGS
10 Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG) Egypt IG EGY
11 Algerian Islamic Extremists Algeria DZA IE DZA
12
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Democratic Republic
of the Congo
ADF COD
13 Al-Nusrah Front Syria ANF SYR
14 Al-Qaida in Iraq Iraq AQI IRQ
15 Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Yemen AQAP YEM
16 Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Algeria AQIM DZA
17 Al-Shabaab Kenya ASB KEN
18 Al-Shabaab Somalia ASB SOM
19 Anarchists Greece ANR GRC
20 Animal Liberation Front (ALF) United States ALF USA
21 Ansar al-Sharia (Libya) Libya AASL LBY
22 Anti-Abortion extremists United States AAE USA
23 Anti-Balaka Militia Central African Republic ABM CAF
24 Arab Separatists Iran ArbSEP IRN
25 Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) El Salvador FARN SLV
26 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Algeria GIA DZA
27
Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement
(MIRA) United States
MIRA USA
28 Army of God United States ArGod USA
29 Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq Iraq AAH IRQ
30 Baader-Meinhof Group Italy BMG ITA
31 Baader-Meinhof Group West Germany (FRG) BMG WestDEU(FRG)
32 Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) Pakistan BLF PAK
33 Baloch Republican Army (BRA) Pakistan BRA PAK
34 Barqa Province of the Islamic State Libya BARIS LBY
35 Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) Spain ETA ESP
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36 Black Nationalists United States BN USA
37 Black Panthers United States BP USA
38 Boko Haram Cameroon BH CMR
39 Boko Haram Chad BH TCD
40 Boko Haram Niger BH NER
41 Boko Haram Nigeria BH NGA
42 Chechen Rebels Russia ChREb RUS
43 Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction) Japan ChukakuhaMCF JPN
44 Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) India CPI-Maoist IND
45 Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (Baidya) Nepal CPNPL-Maoist NPL
46 Communists Philippines Communists PHL
47 Conspiracy of Cells of Fire Greece CCF GRC
48 Coordination Committee (CORCOM) India CORCOM IND
49 Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) France FLNC FRA
50 Corsican National Liberation Front- Historic Channel France CNLF-HC FRA
51 Death Squad El Salvador DS SLV
52 Death Squad Guatemala DS GTM
53
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR) Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR COD
54 Dev Sol Turkey DevSol TUR
55 Dishmish Regiment India DisReg IND
56 Dissident Republicans United Kingdom DisRep GBR
57 Donetsk People’s Republic Ukraine DPR UKR
58 Earth Liberation Front (ELF) United States ELF USA
59 Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo (ERP) (Argentina) Argentina ERP(ARG) ARG
60 Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) El Salvador FMLN SLV
61 Fighting Proletarian Squads Italy FPS ITA
62 First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) Spain GRAPO ESP
63 Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Indonesia FrAc(GAM) IDN
64 Free Syrian Army Syria FSA SYR
65 Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) United States FALN USA
66 Fulani extremists Nigeria FE NGA
67 Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) Guatemala GAP(EGP) GTM
68 Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) Israel Hamas ISR
69 Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) West Bank and Gaza Strip Hamas WBGS
70 Haqqani Network Afghanistan HQN AFG
71 Hezbollah Israel Hez ISR
72 Hezbollah Lebanon Hez LBN
73 Houthi extremists (Ansar Allah) Saudi Arabia Houthi SAU
74 Houthi extremists (Ansar Allah) Yemen Houthi YEM
75 Hutu extremists Burundi Hutuextremists BDI
76 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) Mexico PRI MEX
77 Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ireland IRA IRL
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78 Irish Republican Army (IRA) United Kingdom IRA GBR
79 Irish Republican Extremists United Kingdom IRE GBR
80 Islamic Front (Syria) Syria IF(SYR) SYR
81 Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Algeria FIS DZA
82 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Iraq ISIL IRQ
83 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Lebanon ISIL LBN
84 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Syria ISIL SYR
85 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Turkey ISIL TUR
86 Islamist extremists Algeria IE DZA
87 Israeli extremists West Bank and Gaza Strip ISRex WBGS
88 Israeli settlers West Bank and Gaza Strip ISRsettlers WBGS
89 Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh) Bangladesh JEIs(BGD) BGD
90 Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Jwala Singh (JTMM-J) Nepal JTMM-J NPL
91 Janjaweed Sudan JNJD SDN
92 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Indonesia JI IDN
93 Jewish Defense League (JDL) United States JDL USA
94 Karen National Union Myanmar KNU MMR
95 Khmer Rouge Cambodia KhRo KHM
96 Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State Pakistan KHCIS PAK
97 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Germany KWP(PKK) DEU
98 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Turkey KWP(PKK) TUR
99 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Pakistan LeJ PAK
100 Left-Wing Militants United States LWM USA
101 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Sri Lanka LTTE LKA
102 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Democratic Republic of the Congo LRA COD
103 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Sudan LRA SDN
104 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Uganda LRA UGA
105 Loyalists United Kingdom LYL GBR
106 Luhansk People’s Republic Ukraine LPR UKR
107 M-19 (Movement of April 19) Colombia M-19 COL
108 Mahdi Army Iraq MA IRQ
109 Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) Chile FPMR CHL
110 Maoists India Maoists IND
111 Maoists Nepal Maoists NPL
112 Mayi Mayi Democratic Republic of the Congo MayiMayi COD
113 Meibion Glyndwr United Kingdom MeGlyn GBR
114 Montoneros (Argentina) Argentina Mont(ARG) ARG
115 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Philippines MILF PHL
116 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Philippines MNLF PHL
117 Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Chile) Chile MIR(CHL) CHL
118 Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) Mozambique MNR MOZ
119 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) Iran MEK IRN
120 Murle Tribe Ethiopia MT ETH
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121 Muslim extremists Libya ME LBY
122 Muslim extremists Syria ME SYR
123 Muslim Rebels Algeria MR DZA
124 Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM) Pakistan MQM PAK
125 National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) India NDFB IND
126 National Liberation Army (NLA) (Macedonia) Macedonia NLA(MKD) MKD
127 National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) Colombia ELN COL
128 National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) India NLFT IND
129
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM) India
NSCN-IM IND
130
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) Angola
UNITA AGO
131
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) Namibia
UNITA NAM
132
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) Zambia
UNITA ZMB
133 New People’s Army (NPA) Philippines NPA PHL
134 New World Liberation Front (NWLF) United States NWLF USA
135 Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) Nicaragua FDN NIC
136 Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) Nigeria NDA NGA
137 November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO) Greece N17RO GRC
138 Omega-7 United States OMG USA
139 Opposition Group Bangladesh OG BGD
140 Palestinian Extremists Israel PE ISR
141 Palestinian Extremists West Bank and Gaza Strip PE WBGS
142 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Israel PIJ ISR
143 Palestinians Israel Pls ISR
144 Palestinians West Bank and Gaza Strip Pls WBGS
145 Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM) Honduras FPM HND
146
Patriotic Resistance Front in
Ituri (FRPI) Democratic Republic of the Congo
FRPI COD
147 People’s Liberation Forces (FPL) El Salvador FPL SLV
148 People’s Liberation Front (JVP) Sri Lanka JVP LKA
149 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Israel PFLP ISR
150 Popular Liberation Army (EPL) Colombia EPL COL
151 Popular Resistance Committees Israel PRC ISR
152 Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR) El Salvador BPR SLV
153 Prima Linea Italy PrimaLinea ITA
154 Pro Hartal Activists Bangladesh PHA BGD
155 Protestant extremists United Kingdom PE GBR
156 Red Brigades Italy RB ITA
157 Red Hand Defenders (RHD) United Kingdom RHD GBR
158 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Colombia FARC COL
159 Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA) Greece RPS ELA GRC
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160 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Sierra Leone RUF SLE
161 Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) Thailand RKK THA
162 Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) Algeria GSPC DZA
163 Sanaa Province of the Islamic State Yemen SANIS YEM
164 Separatists France SEP FRA
165 Separatists India SEP IND
166 Separatists Thailand SEP THA
167 Shanti Bahini - Peace Force Bangladesh SBPF BGD
168 Shining Path (SL) Peru SPSL PER
169 Sikh Extremists India SIKHE IND
170 Sinai Province of the Islamic State Egypt SINIS EGY
171 Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA) Pakistan SDLA PAK
172 Student Radicals United States STRA USA
173
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition
(SPLM-IO) South Sudan
SPLM-IO SouthSDN
174 Taliban Afghanistan Taliban AFG
175 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Pakistan TTP PAK
176 The Extraditables Colombia EXT COL
177 Tribesmen Yemen TRB YEM
178 Tripoli Province of the Islamic State Libya TPIS LBY
179 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) Peru MRTA PER
180 Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK) Bolivia EGTK BOL
181 Turkish People’s Liberation Army Turkey TPLA TUR
182 Uighur Separatists China UighurSEP CHN
183 Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) Ireland UFF IRL
184 Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) United Kingdom UFF GBR
185 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) United Kingdom UVF GBR
186 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) India ULFA IND
187 United Popular Action Movement Chile UPAM CHL
188 United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC) Colombia AUC COL
189 White extremists United States WE USA
190 Zebra killers United States ZK USA
The names of 280 targets and their abbreviations that appear in the backbone
of the global terrorist network with 470 nodes are given in Table S5.
Table S5: Names and abbreviations of Targets that appear in the
backbone structure (1970-2016)
Sr. No. Target Name Target
1 Government (General) Afghanistan GOVG AFG
2 Police Afghanistan POL AFG
3 Private Citizens & Property Afghanistan PCP AFG
4 Police Algeria POL DZA
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5 Business United States BUS USA
6 Private Citizens & Property Burundi PCP BDI
7 Private Citizens & Property Democratic Republic of the Congo PCP COD
8 Police Egypt POL EGY
9 Police India POL IND
10 Private Citizens & Property India PCP IND
11 Police Iraq POL IRQ
12 Private Citizens & Property Iraq PCP IRQ
13 Business Iraq BUS IRQ
14 Police Kenya POL KEN
15 Private Citizens & Property Libya PCP LBY
16 Private Citizens & Property Cameroon PCP CMR
17 Private Citizens & Property Nigeria PCP NGA
18 Educational Institution Pakistan EDI PAK
19 Police Pakistan POL PAK
20 Private Citizens & Property Pakistan PCP PAK
21 Business Philippines BUS PHL
22 Government (General) Philippines GOVG PHL
23 Private Citizens & Property Philippines PCP PHL
24 Government (General) Somalia GOVG SOM
25 Private Citizens & Property Somalia PCP SOM
26 Private Citizens & Property South Sudan PCP SouthSDN
27 Private Citizens & Property Sudan PCP SDN
28 Private Citizens & Property Uganda PCP UGA
29 Private Citizens & Property Syria PCP SYR
30 Private Citizens & Property Turkey PCP TUR
31 Police Turkey POL TUR
32 Private Citizens & Property Ukraine PCP UKR
33 Police United States POL USA
34 Police Israel POL ISR
35 Private Citizens & Property Israel PCP ISR
36 Private Citizens & Property West Bank and Gaza Strip PCP WBGS
37 Government (General) Yemen GOVG YEM
38 Police Yemen POL YEM
39 Private Citizens & Property Yemen PCP YEM
40 Private Citizens & Property Northern Ireland PCP NIRL
41 Abortion Related United States Abor USA
42 Private Citizens & Property United States PCP USA
43 Private Citizens & Property Angola PCP AGO
44 Utilities Angola UTL AGO
45 Business Great Britain BUS GBR
46 Business Northern Ireland BUS NIRL
47 Police Northern Ireland POL NIRL
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48 Utilities Chile UTL CHL
49 Transportation China TRP CHN
50 Business Colombia BUS COL
51 Police Colombia POL COL
52 Private Citizens & Property Colombia PCP COL
53 Transportation Colombia TRP COL
54 Government (General) Colombia GOVG COL
55 Utilities Colombia UTL COL
56 Business Peru BUS PER
57 Government (General) Peru GOVG PER
58 Private Citizens & Property El Salvador PCP SLV
59 Utilities El Salvador UTL SLV
60 Government (General) El Salvador GOVG SLV
61 Business France BUS FRA
62 Private Citizens & Property Algeria PCP DZA
63 Government (General) France GOVG FRA
64 Police Spain POL ESP
65 Military United States MIL USA
66 Private Citizens & Property Guatemala PCP GTM
67 Government (General) Iran GOVG IRN
68 Business Ireland BUS IRL
69 Business Turkey BUS TUR
70 Terrorists/Non-State Militia Lebanon TNSM LBN
71 Private Citizens & Property Mozambique PCP MOZ
72 Transportation Mozambique TRP MOZ
73 Government (General) Nepal GOVG NPL
74 Utilities Pakistan UTL PAK
75 Police Peru POL PER
76 Private Citizens & Property Peru PCP PER
77 Utilities Peru UTL PER
78 Police Philippines POL PHL
79 Private Citizens & Property Saudi Arabia PCP SAU
80 Government (General) South Africa GOVG ZAF
81 Police South Africa POL ZAF
82 Government (Diplomatic) Soviet Union GOVD SOV
83 Business Spain BUS ESP
84 Government (General) Spain GOVG ESP
85 Government (General) Sri Lanka GOVG LKA
86 Police Sri Lanka POL LKA
87 Private Citizens & Property Sri Lanka PCP LKA
88 Transportation Sri Lanka TRP LKA
89 Business Chile BUS CHL
90 Government (General) Bangladesh GOVG BGD
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91 Private Citizens & Property Bangladesh PCP BGD
92 Private Citizens & Property Cambodia PCP KHM
93 Transportation Cambodia TRP KHM
94 Police Chile POL CHL
95 Utilities Yemen UTL YEM
96 Telecommunication El Salvador TCM SLV
97 Business El Salvador BUS SLV
98 Business Italy BUS ITA
99 Government (General) Greece GOVG GRC
100 Private Citizens & Property Sierra Leone PCP SLE
101 Business Greece BUS GRC
102 Religious Figures/Institutions Indonesia RFI IDN
103 Transportation Israel TRP ISR
104 Private Citizens & Property Lebanon PCP LBN
105 Police Macedonia POL MKD
106 Private Citizens & Property Myanmar PCP MMR
107 Private Citizens & Property Namibia PCP NAM
108 Private Citizens & Property Nepal PCP NPL
109 Transportation Pakistan TRP PAK
110 Military Syria MIL SYR
111 Utilities Philippines UTL PHL
112 Educational Institution United States EDI USA
113 Utilities Bolivia UTL BOL
114 Private Citizens & Property Zambia PCP ZMB
115 Private Citizens & Property Central African Republic PCP CAF
116 Transportation India TRP IND
117 Private Citizens & Property Niger PCP NER
118 Religious Figures/Institutions Yemen RFI YEM
119 Utilities Iran UTL IRN
120 Refugee Camp Iraq RC IRQ
121 Refugee Camp Sudan RC SDN
122 Airports & Aircraft Afghanistan AA AFG
123 Airports & Aircraft Japan AA JPN
124 Business Afghanistan BUS AFG
125 Business Bangladesh BUS BGD
126 Business Egypt BUS EGY
127 Business Honduras BUS HND
128 Business India BUS IND
129 Business Kenya BUS KEN
130 Business Lebanon BUS LBN
131 Business Libya BUS LBY
132 Business Mexico BUS MEX
133 Business Nicaragua BUS NIC
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134 Business Nigeria BUS NGA
135 Business Pakistan BUS PAK
136 Business Somalia BUS SOM
137 Business South Africa BUS ZAF
138 Business Syria BUS SYR
139 Business Thailand BUS THA
140 Business Yemen BUS YEM
141 Educational Institution Afghanistan EDI AFG
142 Educational Institution India EDI IND
143 Educational Institution Italy EDI ITA
144 Educational Institution Nepal EDI NPL
145 Educational Institution Spain EDI ESP
146 Educational Institution Thailand EDI THA
147 Educational Institution Turkey EDI TUR
148 Government (Diplomatic) Cuba GOVD CUB
149 Government (Diplomatic) France GOVD FRA
150 Government (Diplomatic) Peru GOVD PER
151 Government (Diplomatic) United States GOVD USA
152 Government (General) Argentina GOVG ARG
153 Government (General) Chile GOVG CHL
154 Government (General) Germany GOVG DEU
155 Government (General) Great Britain GOVG GBR
156 Government (General) Guatemala GOVG GTM
157 Government (General) India GOVG IND
158 Government (General) Iraq GOVG IRQ
159 Government (General) Israel GOVG ISR
160 Government (General) Italy GOVG ITA
161 Government (General) Japan GOVG JPN
162 Government (General) Kenya GOVG KEN
163 Government (General) Libya GOVG LBY
164 Government (General) Nicaragua GOVG NIC
165 Government (General) Nigeria GOVG NGA
166 Government (General) Northern Ireland GOVG NIRL
167 Government (General) Pakistan GOVG PAK
168 Government (General) Russia GOVG RUS
169 Government (General) Thailand GOVG THA
170 Government (General) Turkey GOVG TUR
171 Government (General) Ukraine GOVG UKR
172 Government (General) United States GOVG USA
173 Government (General) West Bank and Gaza Strip GOVG WBGS
174 Journalists & Media Afghanistan JAM AFG
175 Journalists & Media Algeria JAM DZA
176 Journalists & Media Chile JAM CHL
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177 Journalists & Media El Salvador JAM SLV
178 Journalists & Media Iraq JAM IRQ
179 Journalists & Media Italy JAM ITA
180 Journalists & Media Pakistan JAM PAK
181 Journalists & Media Peru JAM PER
182 Journalists & Media Somalia JAM SOM
183 Journalists & Media Spain JAM ESP
184 Journalists & Media Yemen JAM YEM
185 Military Afghanistan MIL AFG
186 Military Colombia MIL COL
187 Military Democratic Republic of the Congo MIL COD
188 Military Great Britain MIL GBR
189 Military India MIL IND
190 Military Iraq MIL IRQ
191 Military Libya MIL LBY
192 Military Nigeria MIL NGA
193 Military Northern Ireland MIL NIRL
194 Military Pakistan MIL PAK
195 Military Philippines MIL PHL
196 Military Russia MIL RUS
197 Military Spain MIL ESP
198 Military Sri Lanka MIL LKA
199 Military Turkey MIL TUR
200 Military Yemen MIL YEM
201 NGO Afghanistan NGO AFG
202 Police Bangladesh POL BGD
203 Police El Salvador POL SLV
204 Police France POL FRA
205 Police Great Britain POL GBR
206 Police Indonesia POL IDN
207 Police Italy POL ITA
208 Police Libya POL LBY
209 Police Mexico POL MEX
210 Police Nepal POL NPL
211 Police Nigeria POL NGA
212 Police Russia POL RUS
213 Police Somalia POL SOM
214 Police Thailand POL THA
215 Police Ukraine POL UKR
216 Police West Bank and Gaza Strip POL WBGS
217 Private Citizens & Property Chad PCP TCD
218 Private Citizens & Property Chile PCP CHL
219 Private Citizens & Property Egypt PCP EGY
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220 Private Citizens & Property Ethiopia PCP ETH
221 Private Citizens & Property France PCP FRA
222 Private Citizens & Property Germany PCP DEU
223 Private Citizens & Property Great Britain PCP GBR
224 Private Citizens & Property Greece PCP GRC
225 Private Citizens & Property Indonesia PCP IDN
226 Private Citizens & Property Iran PCP IRN
227 Private Citizens & Property Ireland PCP IRL
228 Private Citizens & Property Italy PCP ITA
229 Private Citizens & Property Kenya PCP KEN
230 Private Citizens & Property Mexico PCP MEX
231 Private Citizens & Property Nicaragua PCP NIC
232 Private Citizens & Property Russia PCP RUS
233 Private Citizens & Property South Africa PCP ZAF
234 Private Citizens & Property Spain PCP ESP
235 Private Citizens & Property Thailand PCP THA
236 Religious Figures/Institutions Afghanistan RFI AFG
237 Religious Figures/Institutions Colombia RFI COL
238 Religious Figures/Institutions India RFI IND
239 Religious Figures/Institutions Iraq RFI IRQ
240 Religious Figures/Institutions Nigeria RFI NGA
241 Religious Figures/Institutions Pakistan RFI PAK
242 Religious Figures/Institutions Philippines RFI PHL
243 Religious Figures/Institutions Somalia RFI SOM
244 Religious Figures/Institutions United States RFI USA
245 Telecommunication Colombia TCM COL
246 Telecommunication India TCM IND
247 Telecommunication Peru TCM PER
248 Telecommunication Philippines TCM PHL
249 Telecommunication Spain TCM ESP
250 Terrorists/Non-State Militia India TNSM IND
251 Terrorists/Non-State Militia Iraq TNSM IRQ
252 Terrorists/Non-State Militia Libya TNSM LBY
253 Terrorists/Non-State Militia Northern Ireland TNSM NIRL
254 Terrorists/Non-State Militia Pakistan TNSM PAK
255 Tourists Spain Tourists ESP
256 Transportation Afghanistan TRP AFG
257 Transportation Chile TRP CHL
258 Transportation El Salvador TRP SLV
259 Transportation Great Britain TRP GBR
260 Transportation Iraq TRP IRQ
261 Transportation Kenya TRP KEN
262 Transportation Nepal TRP NPL
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263 Transportation Nicaragua TRP NIC
264 Transportation Nigeria TRP NGA
265 Transportation Northern Ireland TRP NIRL
266 Transportation Peru TRP PER
267 Transportation Philippines TRP PHL
268 Transportation Russia TRP RUS
269 Transportation South Africa TRP ZAF
270 Transportation Spain TRP ESP
271 Transportation Turkey TRP TUR
272 Utilities India UTL IND
273 Utilities Iraq UTL IRQ
274 Utilities Nigeria UTL NGA
275 Utilities Spain UTL ESP
276 Utilities Turkey UTL TUR
277 Utilities United States UTL USA
278 Violent Political Party India VPP IND
279 Violent Political Party Nepal VPP NPL
280 Violent Political Party Pakistan VPP PAK
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